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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON SETTLEMENT DEVICES:
DOES RULE 68 ENCOURAGE SETTLEMENT?*
DAVID A. ANDERSON** & THOMAS D. ROWE, JR.***
I. INTRODUCTION
Proposals for enhanced settlement offer devices continue to ap-
pear in efforts at civil justice reform. Over a decade ago the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules twice put forward proposed revisions to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 on offers of judgment, but re-
treated under heavy shelling.' Within the last few years the Commit-
tee considered another revision of Rule 68, this one based on a
proposal by the then Director of the Federal Judicial Center, Judge
William Schwarzer. 2 The Committee has not issued any formal revi-
sion proposal, and for a time it seemed its thunder might be stolen by
the Contract with America: The "Attorney Accountability Act of
1995," passed by the House of Representatives as H.R. 988 in early
* This project received financial support from the Duke University Research Council, the
Duke University School of Law, and Centre College. We are grateful for comments and
suggestions from Steve Burbank, Geoffrey Miller, Robert Schapiro, John Shapard, Charles
Silver, and Laura Underkuffler, and for the research assistance of Yang Shan.
** Department of Economics, Centre College, Danville, Kentucky.
*** School of Law, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. Professor Rowe now serves
as a member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, which is continuing to consider possible
revisions of Rule 68. The views expressed in this Article do not represent the position of the
Advisory Committee or of any other member.
1. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., with Neil Vidmar, Empirical Research on Offers of Settlement:
A Preliminary Report, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 15, & nn.8-10 (Autumn 1988).
2. William W Schwarzer, Fee-Shifting Offers of Judgment-An Approach to Reducing the
Cost of Litigation, 76 JUDICATURE 147 (1992). The central feature of the Schwarzer proposal
and of the draft considered by the Advisory Committee is a "capped-benefit-of-the-judgment"
formula for reckoning attorney fee liability. Rather than being liable for all of an adversary's
reasonable post-expiration-of-offer fees, a party who rejected and did not improve on an offer
would ordinarily owe the amount of such fees minus the difference between the offer and the
judgment, limited by the total amount of the judgment. Thus, a plaintiff who rejected an offer of
$50,000 and recovered only $40,000, with the defendant incurring $15,000 in reasonable fees
after expiration of its offer, would owe $5,000 of the defendant's fees. (The effect, with the
$40,000 verdict reduced by the plaintiffs $5,000 fee liability to $35,000, would be to leave the
defendant-with its $15,000 in fees-out of pocket the total of $50,000 the defendant had offered
to part with. Recovery below $35,000 would yield an offer-judgment differential greater than the
fee amount, eliminating all fee liability but leaving the defendant out less than $50,000 total;
hence the "benefit-of-the-judgment" label.) The limit on fee liability to the total amount of the
judgment would mean that if the plaintiff recovered, say, only $10,000, its net award could not go
below zero no matter what the offer had been, or what amount of reasonable post-expiration
attorney fees the defendant incurred. This cap is meant to avoid what might be the excessively
harsh effect of driving successful plaintiffs into the hole, and also would reduce both sides' incen-
tives to invest heavily in small-stakes cases.
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March of 1995, includes an offer of settlement device that would apply
in all federal diversity actions except to claims seeking equitable relief.
The Act makes one who rejects an adversary's formal offer but fails to
obtain a more favorable judgment ordinarily liable for the offeror's
post-offer attorney fees and other costs and expenses.3 Although this
provision seems unlikely to be adopted in the present Congress, its
appearance in H.R. 988 shows the continuing attractiveness of such
proposals.
Despite the increasing prominence of offer devices in discussions
of procedural reform, and a good deal of speculation and theoretical
work about their likely effects,4 extremely little empirical work has
been done to see whether they actually serve their intended goal of
encouraging pretrial settlements. The research reported in this Arti-
cle provides the first empirical evidence drawn primarily from practi-
tioner subjects on the effects of offers of settlement. The study
continues the vital inquiry into the differences that altered offer rules
might make, a process initiated with theoretical investigations and
preliminary empirical results from a paper questionnaire administered
to student subjects.5 This Article reports on an interactive computer
simulation of a tort litigation case. The results indicate that Rule 68
has the potential to influence settlement bargaining, although changes
like those being considered for Rule 68 should be considered with
caution, as even increased stakes may not carry the potency often
ascribed to the Rule. This research also tests the Sincerity Rule, an
unconventional but theoretically exemplary offer rule, with promising
results.
The essence of the offer of judgment or offer of settlement de-
vice-on the books and in proposed revisions-has been that a party
(in the version examined below, as in the Schwarzer and H.R. 988
3. H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995). The bill has puzzling provisions about fee
recoverability starting only on the date of the last offer by an offeror or offeree. It also contains
limits on fee liability different from those in the Schwarzer proposal, see Schwarzer, supra note
2, by permitting denial of awards when requiring payment of fees and expenses would be "mani-
festly unjust," and limiting liability to the other side to the amount of one's own fees.
4. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 and Beyond, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 225 (1994); Rowe with Vidmar, supra note 1, at 15-17.
5. Rowe with Vidmar, supra note 1. The Rowe with Vidmar article included an introduc-
tory sketch of the setting where debates over offer of settlement rules take place-existing rules,
earlier proposed changes, leading decisions and commentary, and arguments over possible bene-
fits and dangers of enhanced offer rules. See id. at 13-19. That summary remains reasonably
current in most respects, and readers who would like more background in the area might wish to
consult it. For brevity and economy, we will say no more here, except to clarify that we will
occasionally use the term "enhanced" as shorthand to refer to offer rules that can affect attorney
fee liability and entitlement and that may be made by either side.
[Vol. 71:519
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON SETTLEMENT DEVICES
versions, either party) can formalize an offer to settle or to have judg-
ment entered on certain terms, with the offeree exposed to adverse
consequences if she does not accept the offer, and then fails to do well
enough in the ultimate result as measured against the offer. To put
the point another way, the rule makes "losers" suffer consequences,
such as liability for post-offer costs or attorney fees, and the formal
offer changes the benchmark of what counts as "losing" for purposes
of determining cost or fee liability. A plaintiff, say, may win a verdict,
but will incur liability for the defendant's reasonable post-offer costs
or fees (or those incurred after expiration of the offer, to give the
plaintiff time to consider it) if the verdict is not good enough in rela-
tion to a rejected defendant's offer.
Intertwined issues in debates over possible changes in Federal
Rule 68 and state counterparts have been of several kinds. Some are
analytical, concerning the mechanics and logistics of possible revi-
sions. Others go to policy, dealing with the nature and degree of con-
sequences that litigants should face from the operation of such rules,
and the consequences' consistency with other law such as prevailing
civil rights plaintiffs' statutory entitlement to attorney fees.6 Still
other concerns are both theoretical and empirical, raising questions
about the direction and strength of the possible changes' impact on
the pursuit of claims and defenses and on the likelihood, timing, and
terms of settlements. This Article focuses on this last set of concerns,
and on settlement likelihood in particular, striving for realism by using
practitioner subjects and computer technology that presents an inter-
active simulation of a hypothetical tort litigation situation.
6. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. III 1991). For further discussion of the interrelation
between offer rules and fee award statutes, see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., & David A. Anderson,
One-Way Fee Shifting and Offer of Judgment Rules: An Experiment, 36 JURIMErRICS J. 255
(1996); Rowe with Vidmar, supra note 1, at 18 nn.24-25.
The "capped-benefit-of-the-judgment" approach of the Schwarzer proposal, see Schwarzer,
supra note 2 and accompanying text, is intended to make offer rules more effective by adding
possible attorney fee liability to the consequences facing a rejecting offeree. At the same time,
its limiting features might alleviate the fears of those concerned with severe impacts and conflicts
with statutory fee entitlements. The limits in the H.R. 988 version probably do less to moderate
the rule's impact than the limits in the Schwarzer proposal.
The present research tests a rule version that corresponds to the earlier Advisory Commit-
tee proposals, without limiting features like those in the Schwarzer proposal or H.R. 988. How-
ever, the Rowe with Vidmar article found "no significant differences," Rowe with Vidmar, supra
note 1, at 30, in the effects reported there between a Schwarzer-type Rule 68 and a full fee-
shifting version, which later was used both in that previous simulation and in our present re-
search. It seems likely, then, that the results reported here for the full fee-shifting offer rule will
have applicability to rules patterned on the Schwarzer proposal or the H.R. 988 version.
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II. EMPIRICAL ISSUES AND HYPOTHESES7
A major stated purpose and expectation for offer rules is to pro-
mote pretrial settlements in civil litigation.8 Discussion of such rules
often assumes that enhancing offer rules (as by adding attorney fee
liability or making the offer device usable by claimants as well as de-
fendants) will raise the settlement rate.9 Contrary theoretical analysis
has suggested that-at least absent significant risk aversion among of-
ferees'°-Rule 68 variants should have few, if any, effects on the set-
tlement rate." In brief, the argument is that settlement requires
7. Some of our hypotheses as stated in this Article will strike readers as intuitively
improbable; often we are likely to agree, and the reason for the statements has to do with the
methodology of social science empirical work rather than the nafvet6 of the authors. Ideally,
when it comes to stating and testing hypotheses, experimenters are cold-bloodedly impartial: we
should state our pet propositions and our btes noires alike in the form that most lends itself to
empirical testing, which most often will be an affirmative proposition subject to experimental
disproof. Thus, we may not start with the view that lawyers' experience teaches them nothing,
and that lawyers react to cases in the same way that law students do; but we will state as our
"null" (i.e., subject to falsification) hypothesis that practitioners and upperclass law students will
react similarly to the same scenario and background information. Some hypotheses, of course,
are stated in the form that theoretical analysis predicts that they will hold true, such as the
Sincerity Rule's effect of inducing settlement at the expected verdict level. Then, in effect, we
are daring the data to show us wrong-which they may or may not do, and if they do, we may
need to go back to the drawing board and revise the theoretical analysis that yielded the
undermined hypothesis. In any event, the form in which an hypothesis is stated is not necessarily
a sign of the experimenters' expectations about its truth or falsity, and often the most we can say
is that the data do not suggest that we should reject the initial hypothesis.
8. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 165 n.11 (Winter 1984).
9. See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 2, at 152 ("The assumption underlying the proposed
revision is that it will encourage parties to make earlier and more reasonable offers, leading to
earlier settlement negotiations with greater prospects of success."). The Schwarzer article goes
on to acknowledge the issues raised by economic analyses about whether offer rules in particu-
lar, and attorney fee shifting in general, would encourage or discourage settlements. See id. at
152-53; see also Questionnaire Concerning Proposed Amendments to Rule 68, FRCP, Question
14 (Apr. 1994) (questions and answer tabulations from Federal Judicial Center survey of counsel
in selected recent federal cases) (on file with the authors) (75% of respondents expecting that
amendment of Rule 68 allowing offers by both sides that would create partial attorney fee liabil-
ity probably would "result in more cases reaching settlement").
10. With offer rules increasing the span of possible outcomes and threatening offerees with
attorney fee liability they would not otherwise face, risk aversion among offerees or those advis-
ing them could lead to acceptance of Rule 68 offers that would not be accepted without a formal
offer rule affecting fee liability. Such a tendency to accept otherwise unacceptable offers could
lead to an increase in the settlement rate, an effect commonly viewed as desirable in itself; but
this benefit could come at the cost of playing on weaknesses of thinly financed parties and driv-
ing them to accept offers inferior to the expected value of a litigated judgment.
11. See Anderson, supra note 4; Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J.
LEGAL STUD. 93, 110-16 (1986); Dale A. Oesterle, Proposed Rule 68 on Offers of Settlement, 10
CORNELL L.F. 11, 11-12 (Feb. 1984); George L. Priest, Regulating the Content and Volume of
Litigation: An Economic Analysis, 1 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 163, 168-71 (1983); Rowe, supra note
8, at 166-69. But see Kathryn E. Spier, Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules,
25 RAND J. ECON. 197, 211, 198 (1994) (especially if parties start from different expectations
about the level of damages, "broadening the definition of costs to include attorneys' fees and
extending the [formal offer] rules to offers made by either litigant will increase their effective-
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agreement on an amount between the most the defendant could ex-
pect to lose and the least the plaintiff could expect to gain. Failures to
settle in the absence of an offer rule result primarily from 1) disagree-
ment over the probable jury award, or 2) bargaining impasse over how
to divide the joint savings from not going to trial. 12 Rule 68 may alter
the litigants' best possible outcomes, but it does not remove either of
these generalized impediments to settlement (although it can affect
their strength). Further, making a formal offer that is not accepted
can have a "dig-in" effect that reduces the likelihood of settlement.
This effect can come about because the making of an offer improves
the offeror's expected outcome from trial, perhaps by more than it
worsens a relatively optimistic adversary's expected yield from trial.
The result can be that the parties are further apart than before; and
the offeror, choosing in later bargaining between settlement and trial,
will have less reason to settle because of the increased attractiveness
of the trial's likely outcome.
13
This disagreement over the likely effects of enhanced offer rules
is crucial to their possible revision, and is an empirical issue that this
Article attempts to address. The possibility that offer rules may not
accomplish one of their main ends also makes it important to think
ness in encouraging settlement," primarily by facilitating "the credible transmission of informa-
tion between the litigants").
12. These explanations for failure to settle draw on two widely used approaches in theoreti-
cal models of litigant behavior, often referred to as the "optimism" and "strategic behavior"
frameworks. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MicH. L. REv. 319, 321 (1991); Rowe with
Vidmar, supra note 1, at 31 nn.53-55. Gross and Syverud find support for the presence of both
kinds of factors in their empirical study of cases that did not settle, but also find that several
other characteristics of the litigation context and the relations among litigants and attorneys are
necessary to a fuller understanding of bargaining impasses. See Gross & Syverud, supra at 322,
378-79.
13. Even if this effect holds true, offer rules could still have other desirable effects such as
bringing about earlier settlements in cases that are likely to settle anyway, and affecting the
terms of settlement so that parties with strong cases have stronger bargaining positions and need
give up less in bargaining to recalcitrant adversaries. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 239-40;
Rowe, supra note 8, at 169-70. Our present study did not attempt to measure the effects of offer
rules on the timing of settlement, although high rates of respondents saying that they would
recommend a Rule 68 counter-demand or counter-offer following the client's presumed rejection
of the other side's Rule 68 offer (92% for plaintiffs' counsel, 83% for defense counsel) do sug-
gest some success at eliciting prompt offers and demands. The amounts counter-demanded by
plaintiffs were also significantly higher than their bottom lines under no fee-affecting Rule 68
($28,820 vs. $25,520, significant at the 95% level of confidence), providing some confirmation of
the strengthening of bargaining positions. The Rule 68 counter-offers of defendants, who were
more receptive to the initial Rule 68 offers at every level, see infra note 25 and Figure 1, were not
significantly different from their no-rule bottom lines. One may also favor offer rules on non-
instrumental grounds, out of a sense that it is morally just that a party who rejected an offer that
later proved reasonable should bear costs and fees required for further proceedings occasioned
by the rejection. See Rowe, supra note 8, at 165.
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about possible alternative devices that might work better. Our re-
search treats that question by empirically testing, along with a stan-
dard type of offer rule affecting attorney fee liability, the Sincerity
Rule, a variant that provides theoretically ideal incentives. The
Sincerity Rule and related mechanisms have been discussed in the
literature on legal reform and game theory, 14 but have not yet been
tested empirically.
Under the Sincerity Rule, either party can make a final offer des-
ignated as a Sincerity Offer. The offeree may either accept the offer
or continue to trial, in which case the offeror would pay the offeree's
reasonable post-offer fees (whatever the outcome), rather than the
other way around as with conventional offer rules. There is sound
method to the apparent madness of this reverse twist: the offeree ef-
fectively must choose between the offer and the expected jury award
(with fees paid), meaning that "reasonable" offers approximating the
expected jury award should be accepted, and unreasonable offers
should be rejected. It is desirable for the offeror to make an offer
near the expected jury award to avoid the fees, other costs, and uncer-
tainty of trial, and it is desirable for the offeree to accept such an offer
because the alternative (trial) has the same expected value with added
uncertainty. 15 Moreover, the offeror's possible fee liability would
strongly motivate offerors to make offers favorable enough to the ad-
versary to have a high chance of being accepted.' 6 Although the
Sincerity Rule as framed in our simulation may be intolerably rigid for
real-world adoption, the use of computerized techniques simulating
litigation situations provides a valuable opportunity for the testing of
such unconventional approaches, and can help move meritorious ap-
proaches from the realm of theory onto the agenda for practical con-
sideration. A more detailed explanation of the Sincerity Rule appears
in the Appendix.
14. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 240-41; Vincent P. Crawford, A Procedure for Generating
Pareto Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations, 47 ECONOMETRICA 49 (1979); Herv6 Moulin,
Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution, 33 J. ECON. TrEORY 32 (1984); Herv6
Moulin, The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus, 51 REv. ECON. STUD. 157
(1984).
15. For compelling practical reasons, settlement could not be allowed after the rejection of
a Sincerity Rule offer; the parties must go to trial. If negotiation could follow the rejection, the
offeree's bargaining position would be greatly improved by having the alternative of a free ride
at trial. Potential offerors would therefore avoid making such offers, and the rule would be
ineffectual. The tradeoff between expediting settlement and shortening the period during which
new information can affect negotiations occurs under any rule that accelerates settlement-in-
formation that comes to light after the early settlement is beside the point.
16. The Sincerity Rule might also be called the "Godfather Rule" because it creates incen-
tives to make an offer that is too good to be refused.
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In our empirical research we test two principal hypotheses: 1) of-
fer of settlement rules in their usual form with rejecting offerees ex-
posed to adverse consequences (even with the addition of attorney fee
liability) do not increase the settlement rate;17 and 2) under the
Sincerity Rule with its favorable consequence of fee payment for a
rejecting offeree, settlement offers are likely to be made and accepted
near the level of the offeree's expected judgment, when adversaries
interpret case data rationally and have similar expectations about the
likely result of trial.' 8 Aware that it is a significant unknown how real-
istic common assumptions of risk neutrality, rational data interpreta-
tion, and adversaries' similar expectations about likely judgments are,
we test the accuracy of those assumptions. 19 Our research design
makes this effort possible by gathering data from experienced lawyers
on both plaintiffs' and defendants' sides about expected judgments,
the "density function" of likely outcomes, and bottom line settlement
recommendations with and without offer rules affecting attorney fee
liability.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
The survey device was an interactive, computerized litigation sim-
ulation completed by 131 practicing lawyers and 27 upperclass law stu-
dents.20 The lawyers were mostly participants in an American Inn of
Court; others were members of the Dispute Resolution Committee of
the North Carolina Bar Association.21 While responses were anony-
17. Or more precisely, given our mostly lawyer subjects, they do not lead counsel to make
recommendations in response to formal offers that would increase the settlement rate.
18. Strategic bargaining, see supra note 12 and accompanying text, can sometimes lead to
trial rather than settlement even between rational parties with similar trial expectations. There
remains room, then, for settlement devices to raise the settlement rate even under those
assumptions.
19. On one significance of having more information about such assumptions, see Oesterle,
supra note 11, at 12. Oesterle describes situations involving parties' divergent judgment expecta-
tions in which he argues that a Rule 68 that affects parties' liability for adversaries' attorney fees
will reduce the likelihood of settlements between risk-neutral litigants. He then points out that
the absence of information on such relative litigation value expectations means that we do not
know how many cases are like his examples, and "we can only guess whether we will gain more
settlements than we will lose." Id.; see also Laurens Walker, Avoiding Surprise from Federal
Civil Rulemaking: The Role of Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 569 (1994) (stressing the
importance of testing proposed rule alterations empirically).
20. The simulation is available from the authors on computer diskette or in printed form.
21. We are grateful to the American Inns of Court Foundation and the Dispute Resolution
Committee of the North Carolina Bar Association for their cooperation in providing endorse-
ment of our research and mailing lists of their members, and to the members who completed the
computer simulation and returned diskettes. The American Inns of Court Foundation is a na-
tional law organization with approximately 10,000 practitioner, judge, and law student members,
which includes among its objectives the promotion of civility in litigation. That emphasis in-
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mous, the computer program collected information on practitioner re-
spondents' experience in tort litigation, year of first bar admission,
and office ZIP code so that our statistical analysis could control for
variables of experience and geographic location. The student subjects
were upperclass Duke law students. Participation in all cases was vol-
untary, and response rates from the groups whose participation was
sought were approximately 10% for the practitioners and 5% for the
law students.22
Depending on information about a respondent's status and expe-
rience, the program put each respondent on either a plaintiff's or a
defendant's "track." Lawyers with tort experience who mostly repre-
sented defendants went into the defendant's track; all students and
those lawyers who mostly represented plaintiffs went into the plain-
tiff's track; and lawyers with no particular emphasis were assigned
randomly. Both tracks presented the same factual information, but
called on respondents to play the role of defense or plaintiff's counsel
and to recommend offer or demand levels, acceptance or rejection of
the adversary's offers, etc. This channeling of respondents, and the
ability to identify experienced plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel
among those on each track, permitted measuring what verdicts those
working each side expected on identical facts, which allowed us to as-
sess the presence or absence of optimism about likely results. If opti-
mism was present on one side and not offset by pessimism on the
other, or if present on both sides, such optimism put the parties fur-
ther apart, and worked against settlement.
The scenario used in the simulation is a common personal injury
auto tort, the type of case that makes up about half of all tort filings in
courts of general jurisdiction. 23 The findings regarding the effects of
troduces the possibility of some bias in our sample, but there is reason to expect that it might be
minimal because much of the focus of our research is on the extent of differences between be-
havior under varying forms of offer rules. We sent our survey materials to practitioner members
of selected Inns, chosen for geographical and city-size dispersion.
22. These response rates, of course, raise questions about self-selection effects inducing bias
in the samples. We cannot rule out some biases of unknown direction and magnitude; with the
survey instrument sent out on a diskette with respondents asked to run the program and mail
back the diskette, our sample is presumably more computer-literate than the entire population
in the groups sampled or than the lawyer population as a whole. Still, we know of no basis for
inferring bias in the likely results, and the self-reported characteristics were broadly representa-
tive of the lawyer population at large. Our response rate from practitioners is respectable com-
pared with other single mailings to similar populations. Telephone Interview with David
Akridge, Membership Director, American Inns of Court (May 5,1994). In any event, we see the
results presented here as better--considerably-than no information at all.
23. See, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., TRENDS IN TORT LMGATION 8 (1987). For
advice on the methodology and realism of the simulation, we are grateful to Stephen Burbank,
Avery Katz, Lewis Kornhauser, Laura Macklin, Thomas Metzloff, Michael Meurer, Geoffrey
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settlement rules should therefore be applicable to a broad range of
civil litigation. Besides facts about the case, the program gives infor-
mation about claims and verdicts in several similar cases, based on
actual jury verdict reports. After seeing the scenario of the hypotheti-
cal case and the jury verdict information, respondents were asked to
give estimates of the percentage likelihood of verdicts above several
levels (thus revealing their "density function" of expected verdicts)
and a single amount as their best estimate of the likely jury award.
The shape and similarity of adversaries' density functions affect the
likelihood of settlement. A comparison of the single amount given as
an expected jury award with the expectation calculated from the den-
sity function provides a measure of the mathematical sophistication
with which lawyers use their data, and the strength of any tendencies
toward optimism.
To determine the relative effectiveness of an enhanced Rule 68
affecting liability for post-offer attorney fees and usable by either side,
the program asks subjects first for their advice to a client on what
should be the bottom line in settlement negotiations with no Rule 68
affecting attorney fee liability-the lowest offer or highest demand
that the side should accept in pretrial settlement bargaining. The pro-
gram then describes a simple form of amended Rule 68 affecting lia-
bility for post-offer fees and asks for the respondent's
recommendation on accepting or rejecting Rule 68 offers from the ad-
versary that are $1,000, $2,000, $4,000, $6,000, and $8,000 less
favorable (lower for plaintiffs, higher for defendants) than the bottom
line they had just stated. To check for any effect that offer order may
have on acceptance patterns, the program varies the order between
respondents by starting with the amount nearest to or farthest from
the no-Rule-68 bottom line recommendation and then descending or
ascending. The program then asks whether, supposing that the client
chose to reject the adversary's offer or demand regardless of the re-
spondent's advice, the subject would recommend a counter-demand
or counter-offer, and if so, of what amount. At key points the pro-
gram invited respondents to explain major decisions briefly on a sheet
of paper that could be mailed back with the program diskette.
The program finally explains and tests the Sincerity Rule, under
which the hypothesis is that respondents would recommend accept-
ance of offers more favorable than or equal to the expected verdict.
Miller, Dale Oesterle, Judith Resnik, John Shapard, Roy Simon, Janice Toran, and Laurens
Walker. Any errors are ours.
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In the simulation, the adversary offers settlement under the Sincerity
Rule for the subject's expected verdict of E (taken from the previ-
ously obtained single estimate of likely verdict) plus $3,000, E plus
$1,000, E, E minus $1,000, and E minus $3,000, again with the pro-
gram varying for different respondents between ascending and de-
scending orders. Because the Sincerity Rule, by making the offeror
liable for an offeree's post-offer attorney fees (for simplicity, the pro-
gram instructed respondents to regard other expenses as negligible),
effectively eliminates the monetary cost of proceeding to trial, the re-
sponse to this question provides a measure of risk preference. If trials
are free and an offer of pretrial settlement is there for the taking, a
risk-averse respondent who expects a verdict of E will recommend
accepting some offers less favorable than E. A risk-loving respondent,
however, will roll the dice and counsel rejection of some offers that
are more favorable than E. Again, the program invites brief written
explanations at key points.
Asking each subject to operate under alternative rules after
working under no rule is more realistic than asking each lawyer to
consider a single offer rule in isolation. If an alternative rule is
adopted in the real world, lawyers will be forced to make a similar
cognitive shift to work under the new rule after working under ex-
isting rules, rather than erasing all accumulated experience of current
rules from their knowledge base. Within-subject comparisons are thus
more appropriate here than in studies of inputs when only one input
will affect a particular agent in the real world (e.g., the effect of vari-
ous flu shots on immunity).
IV. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS AND SIMULATION RESULTS
Among the 83% of our respondents who were lawyers, a majority
(77%) reported experience in tort litigation. Respondents came from
all regions of the country, although the largest number lived in the
South because of the use of North Carolina Bar Association members.
The sample includes 92 responses from lawyers representing the plain-
tiff's side (which was the default for students) and 66 responses from
lawyers representing the defendant's side in the simulation. 24 Table 1
defines the variables collected, and Table 2 presents the characteristics
of the sample.
24. Although 17% of the survey respondents were advanced law students rather than prac-
ticing lawyers, all respondents were asked to act as lawyers during the simulation, and will be
referred to as lawyers in our discussion. For an explanation of how respondents were assigned to
sides, see supra text following note 22.
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No RULE MINIMUM ASK
RULE 68 MINIMUM ASK
No RULE MAXIMUM BID
RULE 68 MAXIMUM BID
COMPUTED EXPECTATION
STATED EXPECTATION
The number of years since the lawyer first passed
the bar exam.
Dummy variable equaling 1 if respondent is a
student, 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable equaling 1 if respondent is a
lawyer, 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable equaling 1 if lawyer with tort
experience, 0 otherwise.
D.v. equaling 1 if offers were presented in
descending order, 0 otherwise.
Regional d.v.: 1 if respondent lives in northeastern
U.S., 0 otherwise.
Regional d.v.: 1 if respondent lives in north central
U.S., 0 otherwise.
Regional d.v.: 1 if respondent lives in southern
U.S., 0 otherwise.
Regional d.v.: 1 if respondent lives in western U.S.,
0 otherwise.
Min. acceptable offer to the plaintiff under no offer
rule (in $1000's).
Min. acceptable offer to the plaintiff under Rule 68
(in $1000's).
Max. acceptable demand from the defendant under
no offer rule (in $1000's).
Max. acceptable demand from the defendant under
Rule 68 (in $1000's).
Expectation of the jury award based on density
function (in $1000's).
Stated expectation of the jury award (in $1000's).
A. Conventional Rule 68 Affecting Attorney Fee Liability
To test the hypothesis that Rule 68 is not an effective inducement
to settlement, we observed whether respondents recommended ac-
ceptance of Rule 68 offers (affecting attorney fee liability and avail-
able to both parties) inferior to their recommended bottom line-
their "minimum ask" or "maximum bid"-under no such rule.25 With
no-rule minimum-ask or maximum-bid levels averaging about $25,000,
25. Even if offerees accepted offers inferior to their no-offer-rule minimum ask or maxi-
mum bid, settlement rates still might not rise because of the quality of offers made, or because of
the effect of the offer rule on post-rejection bargaining in cases that would have settled without
an offer rule affecting attorney fee liability. It is, however, a precondition for raising the settle-
ment rate that offerees accept some Rule 68 offers that they would not accept without the rule
(unless an enhanced rule elicited a good many offers acceptable to offerees that would otherwise










LAWYER w/TORT 0.64 0.48
DESCENDING 0.61 0.49
NORTHEAST 0.15 0.35
NORTH CENTRAL 0.21 0.41
SOUTH 0.44 0.50
WEST 0.20 0.40
No RULE MINIMUM ASK 25.52 8.29
RULE 68 MINIMUM ASK 23.83 7.62
No RULE MAXIMUM BID 23.83 8.39
RULE 68 MAXIMUM BID 26.92 8.68
COMPUTED EXPECTATION
PLAINTIFF'S SIDE 32.72 10.97
DEFENDANT'S SIDE 31.77 11.48
STATED EXPECTATION
PLAINTIFF'S SIDE 28.95 9.80
DEFENDANT'S SIDE 26.65 11.41
62% of lawyers acting as counsel for the plaintiff and 91% of lawyers
acting as defense counsel recommended accepting a Rule 68 offer that
was inferior to their no-rule limit by $1,000 (see Figure 1). However,
the acceptance levels dropped to 42% and 61% for offers inferior by
$2,000, and fell to 21% and 39% for offers inferior by $4,000. Despite
our efforts in framing the question 26 about bottom-line recommenda-
tions before the program introduced Rule 68, it is of course possible
that stated bottom lines included an element of bluff.27 Also, some
lawyers regarded a difference of $1,000 as insubstantial-suggesting
that they might have recommended acceptance of such offers even
26. For respondents acting as plaintiff's counsel, the question asked: "If settlement bargain-
ing took place now, what would be the lowest offer that you would recommend that your client
accept at this time?" For the defense side, the parallel question was, "If settlement bargaining
took place now, what would be the highest demand that you would recommend that your side
agree to at this time?"
27. The element of bluff may not be great, however, for Kritzer reports from an empirical
study of legal bargaining that many of lawyers' initial demands and offers (52% of demands,
35% of offers) were no more than equal to their estimates of the appropriate resolution of the
case from their client's viewpoint. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL: UNDER-
STANDING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN ORDINARY LITIGATION 47-48 (1991). Still, enough
demands and offers were outliers (14% of highest demands more than twice the perceived
stakes, and 37% of lowest offers less than half of perceived stakes) that effective offer devices
could have an impact on moderating extreme offers and demands. See id.
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with no fee-affecting Rule 68.28 The decidedly lower but still notable
rates of recommended acceptance of significantly less favorable offers
suggest that this form of Rule 68 might have a modest effect on settle-
ment rates. And even without the participation of clients, the level of
recommended acceptance of offers significantly inferior to the bottom
line no-offer-rule recommendations suggests considerable room for
"low-ball" offer tactics that play on an adversary's risk aversion.
29
In the previous study by Rowe and Vidmar,30 which administered
paper questionnaires to student populations, the authors used t-tests
for the differences in sample means31 to compare acceptance levels
under enhanced versions of Rule 68 and under no such rule. The re-
sults suggested that litigants might accept a less favorable settlement
when given a Rule 68 offer. In the computer simulation results, the
average plaintiff's lawyer would advise the acceptance of as little as
$25,522 under no rule and $23,826 under Rule 68. The maximum of-
fers suggested by defendant's lawyers were $23,833 under no rule and
$26,924 under Rule 68. The hypothesis of lower minimum ask levels
28. From the written comments that respondents were invited to make, the following illus-
trate the point: "There is always a margin of error in case evaluation. One thousand dollars is an
acceptable margin of error." "Twenty thousand dollars is a bottom offer. I might go $1,000 less
to save $6,000 in fees, but two thousand [less] for $6,000 of insurance is too much."
29. Interestingly, the recommended acceptance levels reflected in Figure 1 show defense
counsel regularly recommending acceptance of unfavorable Rule 68 demands at higher rates
than plaintiffs' counsel recommended acceptance of unfavorable Rule 68 offers. In other words,
contrary to commonly expressed concerns, the defense side could be more subject to "high-ball"
demand tactics under enhanced versions of Rule 68 than plaintiffs are vulnerable to "low-ball"
offers. To be sure that the inclusion of law students in the subject group on the plaintiffs' side
did not account for this result, we removed the student responses and found the differences in
the results to be trivial and non-systematic.
This puzzling difference between defense counsel and plaintiffs' counsel is compounded by
a reverse tendency in the data reported under the Sincerity Rule, which awards rejecting offerees
their fees. Thus, Figure 2 reflects that when given a free ride rather than threatened with an
adverse shift, defense counsel showed a stronger tendency than plaintiffs' lawyers to recommend
gambling on trial-even when facing settlement demands that were favorable to their clients.
Colleagues with considerable litigation experience have suggested the following explanation for
this seemingly counter-intuitive pattern of defense counsel being more risk averse when facing
down-side fee threats to their clients, but less conservative when offered a free ride, than plain-
tiffs' counsel: Our sample consisted of lawyers (and a few law students), not clients. Defense
counsel, not working on contingent fees, know all too well the readiness of clients to question fee
billings. Client unhappiness can multiply when the bill is not just for the fees of one's own
defeated champion, but also for the fees of a gallingly victorious plaintiff adversary. By contrast
with this sobering prospect, defense counsel could plausibly be readier to roll the dice with no
threat of fee liability and their own side's fees guaranteed under the Sincerity Rule-in contrast
with plaintiffs' lawyers, whose experience may include unkept promises from the legal system of
full recompense from the other side for time and expenses, coupled with inability to recoup all
such costs from a contingent-fee client.
30. Rowe with Vidmar, supra note 1.
31. A t-test for the difference in sample means uses the means and standard deviations of
the maximum bid or minimum ask levels for lawyers working with and without the influence of
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under Rule 68 can be accepted at the 90% level of confidence for
plaintiffs' lawyers (t = -1.44), and the hypothesis of higher maximum
bid levels can be accepted at the 95% level of confidence for defend-
ants' lawyers (t = 2.08).32 Within-subject differences between mini-
mum ask levels with and without Rule 68 averaged $1,696 with a
standard deviation of $2,047 (t = 0.83). For maximum bid levels the
difference was $3,091 with a standard deviation of $2,664 (t = -1.16).
The direction of these results supports the hypothesis that Rule 68
encourages settlement, although the size and significance of the influ-
ence are unimpressive.
Whereas t-tests based on sample means were more appropriate in
the Rowe-Vidmar study, which used samples of relatively homogene-
ous law and business school students, they do not control for charac-
teristics of the attorneys in this sample that might also affect
settlement decisions. Increased practice experience and past experi-
ence with tort litigation may increase bargaining ability, and thus im-
prove the settlement value that the lawyer expects to obtain-
although experience could also lead to an optimism-tempering real-
ism. Regional differences in income, the cost of living, and local legal
culture undoubtedly affect expectations and bargaining positions.
32. We present t-test results here for comparison with the Rowe-Vidmar results. T-tests of
this sort may yield biased results when based on samples that are not independent (that is, the
same subjects are asked how they would respond in different situations).
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Furthermore, law students may behave differently from lawyers in
their responses to the simulation. Table 3 includes hypotheses and
conjectures about such behavior, with brief notations of the empirical
results. Multiple regression analysis was used to isolate the effects of
the several variables on which data were collected.
33
The independent variables obtained from the survey and con-
trolled for in the regression analysis include whether the respondent is
a lawyer or a law student, the year of a lawyer respondent's first bar
admission, the region of the country in which the respondent practices
or studies (indicated by office ZIP code), and whether the respondent
has previous tort litigation experience. Practice experience is mea-
sured as the number of years since first bar admission (EXPERIENCE).
Regional differences are accounted for using dummy variables 34 for
practice in the West, South, North Central, or Northeastern United
States (contained in the vector REGION). Dummy variables are also
used to represent student status (STUDENT), lawyers with previous tort
experience (LAWYER W/TORT), whether offers were made to the law-
yer in descending valuations (DESCENDING), and the absence of Rule
68 (NO RULE 68). The dependent variable is the natural log of the
minimum (maximum) amount accepted by plaintiffs' (defendants')
lawyers, given whether or not Rule 68 was available. Under the as-
sumption that all slope coefficients are the same with and without
Rule 68, estimation of the equations
Log Minimum Ask = Yo + Y1EXPERIENCE + Y2EXPERIENCE
SQUARED + Y3 DESCENDING + Y4 REGION + 'Y5STUDENT + Y6 LAWYER
W/TORT + 77NO RULE 68 + &P(1)
and
33. Multiple regression analysis measures the effect of two or more independent variables
on a dependent variable. This technique estimates the effect of each independent variable while
controlling for the simultaneous influence of the other independent variables (i.e., holding the
other independent variables constant). The coefficient on each independent variable, which ap-
pears before the associated variable in a multiple regression equation (e.g., the ys in equation 1
in the text infra), indicates the change in the dependent variable resulting from an increase by
one in that independent variable. When the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of a
variable, the coefficients represent the percentage changes in the dependent variables resulting
from an increase by one in the associated independent variables.
34. A dummy variable such as STUDENT equals one if the variable applies to the respondent
and zero otherwise. If one variable out of each complementary set (e.g., DESCENDING or AS-
CENDING; STUDENT or LAWYER W/O TORT or LAWYER W/TORT) is not omitted from the regression
equation, the serious problem of "multicollinearity" occurs, and results will be flawed. The coef-
ficient on a dummy variable represents the average difference between the value of the depen-
dent variable when the dummy variable is relevant, and when the omitted dummy variable is






An enhanced Rule 68 would
not promote settlement.
The Sincerity Rule allows
either party to initiate settle-
ment successfully at the level
of the expected verdict.
Lawyers are risk-neutral.
Given a standard amount of
case information, litigants
will have similar expecta-
tions of the verdict.
Given a standard amount of
case information, litigants
will have similar density
functions for the expected
verdict.
Lawyers process case infor-
mation in a rational and
sophisticated manner.
Plaintiffs' lawyers will expect
higher verdicts than defend-
ants' lawyers due to undue
optimism.
Advanced law students will
respond to case scenarios
similarly to lawyers.
Practice experience will
increase expected gains from
bargaining.
Tort litigation experience
will increase expected gains
from bargaining.
The region where a lawyer
practices will affect her bar-
gaining decisions.
EMPIRICAL RESULT*
The hypothesis that all intercept and slope coefficients
are simultaneously equal in the no-rule and Rule 68
equations cannot be rejected at the 80 percent level of
significance or higher based on the results of the
Chow test (F = 0.141). Standard regression analysis
suggests that Rule 68 would decrease minimum ask
levels by 7 percent and decrease maximum bid levels
by 14 percent.
The results indicate that Sincerity Offers are likely to
be accepted if and only if they are at or near the
adverse party's expected verdict.
Under the assumption of rationality, 41 percent of
lawyers surveyed had an element of risk aversion in
their strategy.
The difference between expected verdicts based on
the lawyers' density functions is not statistically signif-
icant, but the difference between their stated expecta-
tions is.
The standard deviation of density estimates is as large
as 16 percentage points for some verdict levels.
The difference between the stated expectations of the
likely verdict and the computed expected values based
on the lawyers' density functions for possible awards
is statistically significant.
The difference between stated expectations for plain-
tiffs' and defendants' lawyers is statistically significant.
Students' minimum ask levels were significantly
higher than lawyers'. Students demanded 17 percent
more than lawyers without tort experience and 8 per-
cent more than lawyers with tort experience.
Practice experience has a positive but insignificant
effect on minimum ask levels and a negative and sig-
nificant effect on maximum bid levels.
Experience with tort litigation has a positive but insig-
nificant effect on both minimum ask levels and maxi-
mum bid levels.
Plaintiffs' lawyers from the West demand the lowest
settlements, while those in the north central U.S.
demand the highest settlements. Defendants' lawyers
from the north central region will pay the least, while
those from the Northeast will pay the most.
* Unless otherwise noted, results designated as statistically significant meet the criterion for
significance at the 90 percent level of confidence or higher.
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Log Maximum Bid = 80 + 8IEXPERIENCE + 5 2DESCENDING +
53 REGION + 5 4 LAWYER W/TORT + 55 NO RULE 68 + -p
(2)
measures the effect of Rule 68 in encouraging and moderating
settlements.
The regression results from equations (1) and (2) are reported in
Tables 4 and 5. Law students acting as plaintiffs' lawyers (no students
TABLE 4




LAWYER w/TORT 0.092 1.35
EXPERIENCE 0.011 1.25
EXPERIENCE SQUARED -0.00030 -1.22
DESCENDING 0.16 2.57
NORTHEAST 0.11 1.31
NORTH CENTRAL 0.26 3.28
SOUTH 0.049 0.77
No RULE 68 0.070 1.54
* The adjusted R-squared for this regression was 0.09.
** Significance at the 90% confidence level corresponds with a t-ratio
above 1.64 in absolute value.
TABLE 5
ESTIMATES OF LOG MAXIMUM BID EQUATION*
Variable Coefficient t-ratio
CONSTANT 3.34 28.48




NORTH CENTRAL -0.14 -1.31
SOUTH -0.092 -0.98
No RULE 68 -0.14 -2.11
* The adjusted R-squared for this regression was 0.06.
** See supra note 35 for discussion of experience squared omission.
completed the defendants'-side survey) are found to demand higher
settlement values than lawyers, suggesting that practice experience
may indeed temper unrealistic expectations. Plaintiffs' lawyers in the
West demanded the lowest settlement values, and those in the north
central region demanded the highest. Defendants' lawyers from the
Northeast were willing to pay the highest settlements, and those from
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the north central region were willing to pay the lowest. Defendants'
lawyers held out for lower settlements as practice experience in-
creased,35 although experience with tort litigation did not have a sig-
nificant effect. Also statistically insignificant was the finding that
plaintiffs' lawyers with more years of practice experience, or with tort
litigation experience, demanded higher settlements. As in the t-test
results, the hypothesis of lower minimum ask levels under Rule 68 can
be accepted at the 90% level of confidence, and the hypothesis of
higher maximum bid levels can be accepted at the 95 % level of confi-
dence. The coefficients on No RULE 68 indicate that Rule 68 de-
creases recommended minimum ask levels by 7% and increases
recommended maximum bid levels by 14%.
To account for the possibility that Rule 68 affects the decisions of
different types of lawyers in different ways (e.g., lawyers more re-
cently out of law school might be more receptive to Rule 68), a Chow
test for structural change allows the assumption of equal slope coeffi-
cients with and without Rule 68 to be relaxed.36 Using the un-
restricted equations
No Rule Log Minimum Ask = a0 + lEXPERIENCE +
c 2EXPERIENCE SQUARED + (c3 DESCENDING + Ct4REGION +
Q 5 STUDENT + a 6LAWYER W/TORT + ,n
(3)
and
Rule 68 Log Minimum Ask = 30 + 1EXPERIENCE + 032EXPERIENCE
SQUARED + 3 DESCENDING + 0 4REGION + P 5STUDENT +
P36LAWYER W/TORT + Er
(4)
and the restricted equation (1) (and the analogous equations for the
defendants' side) without the No RULE 68 dummy variable, the Chow
test statistic37 evaluates the null hypothesis that Rule 68 does not af-
fect the acceptance of settlement offers. The hypothesis that all inter-
35. The maximum bid regression reported in Table 5 was also estimated with the experience
squared variable added as in the minimum ask regression reported in Table 4. The results indi-
cated that the effect of experience on maximum bid levels is approximately linear, making the
experience squared variable inappropriate for the maximum bid equation.
36. More intuitively, the Chow test measures the accuracy of the estimated relationships
between minimum ask (or maximum bid) levels and lawyer characteristics when minimum ask
levels under Rule 68 and no-rule are pooled together in the "restricted equation," and compares
it to the accuracy of the estimated relationships when separate "unrestricted" equations are esti-
mated for each circumstance. If there is no appreciable improvement in the accuracy when
separate equations are estimated, the Chow test accepts the hypothesis that there is no change in
minimum ask levels when Rule 68 is made available.
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cept and slope coefficients are simultaneously equal in the no-rule and
Rule 68 equations (ai = Pi for i = 1 to 6) cannot be rejected at any
reasonable level of confidence by the results of the Chow test (F =
0.27 for plaintiffs' lawyers and 0.73 for defendants' lawyers). The
Chow test results support the theoretical analysis suggesting that Rule
68 would not encourage out of court settlement by inducing the ac-
ceptance of more moderate offers.38 These results are inconsistent,
however, with the t-test and regression analyses of Rule 68's effects,
particularly those on defendants' lawyers' decisions.
Although the assumptions implicit in the Chow test are less re-
strictive than those associated with the t-tests and standard regression
analysis, the potential validity of the latter set of assumptions and the
margin for error in any test allow for the possibility that Rule 68
would bring settlement demands and offers closer together. It is pos-
sible that weak effects on each party's bottom line would cumulate
into a more substantial effect on the existence of a settlement range-
a set of potential settlement values between the plaintiff's minimum
demand and the defendant's maximum offer. After a random pairing
of 66 lawyer respondents from each side of the case, 48% of the pairs
had a settlement range without Rule 68 in the picture. For the same
pairs, 65% had a settlement range under our hypothetical enhanced
Rule 68. Unfortunately, the existence of a settlement range does not
mean that the parties will settle. The obstacles of optimism and strate-
gic behavior persist in the presence of a settlement range, and alterna-
tive rules may be needed to overcome these impediments.
B. Sincerity Rule
The hypothesis under the Sincerity Rule is that settlement offers
are likely to be made and accepted near the level of the offeree's ex-
pected judgment.39 Figure 2 indicates that under the Sincerity Rule, a
majority of plaintiffs' lawyers would accept offers greater than or
equal to their expected jury award (Ep), but that the acceptance level
drops to 48% and 37% for offers $1,000 and $3,000 below Ep respec-
where m is the number of restrictions and s? is the estimate of the unrestricted regression
variance.
38. See Anderson, supra note 4.
39. An intended purpose of Rule 68 in its various forms is to promote the making and
acceptance of more moderate offers. The Sincerity Rule, by contrast, is expected to induce set-
tlement at values near the expected jury award. Since the purposes of the two rules are not the
same, this study evaluates the effectiveness of each rule in achieving its intended purpose, rather
than comparing the rules directly.
19951
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tively.40 As the defendant prefers not to offer more than Ep, and of-
fers less than Ep are likely to be rejected, these results suggest that
Sincerity Offers by defendants are likely to succeed if and only if they
approximate Ep. Similarly, the results indicate that the majority of
defendants' lawyers will accept Sincerity Offers less than or equal to
Ed, but not below Ed, meaning that Sincerity Offers by plaintiffs are
likely to succeed if and only if they are at or near Ed. The Sincerity
Rule thus may afford a viable solution to unfair settlements and bar-
gaining breakdown caused by unequal or disputed bargaining power if
either party is willing to offer an amount near the adverse party's ex-
pected jury award (and potential offerors have cost-saving incentives
to do so), because such offers are likely to be accepted.
41
The prospect of an acceptable Sincerity Offer and the perceived
fairness of the resulting settlement value improve when Ed and Ep are
similar.42 If Ed = Ep, then settlement under the Sincerity Rule will
occur as long as either party is willing to offer its own expected jury
award. Such a settlement is "fair" in that the plaintiff receives the
amount both sides would expect a jury to award her at trial. Figure 3
presents the average density function for expected jury verdicts.
Although the standard deviation of density estimates is as large as 16
percentage points for verdicts between $10,000 and $20,000, the aver-
age expected jury verdicts calculated from these density functions are
very close ($32,717 for the plaintiffs' side and $31,768 for the defend-
ants' side), and the hypothesis that expected jury awards are alike can-
not be rejected at any reasonable level of significance (t = 0.52).
43
40. These figures may reflect some misunderstanding of an unfamiliar rule, as recom-
mended acceptance levels remained above 25% in both groups for offers $3,000 worse than the
expected judgment-even though trial would be a free ride with the offeror liable for the of-
feree's fees. If the acceptance of offers inferior to the expected judgment decreased as lawyers
became familiar with the rule, the long-run influence of this rule in inducing offers near offerees'
expected judgments would be even greater and more desirable than our results imply.
41. The intuition behind this behavior is that savings from settling without trial make it
worthwhile to make Sincerity Offers, and the ban on post-offer settlement bargaining defeats
efforts to capture further gains from bargaining. See supra text following note 14; Anderson,
supra note 4; and the Appendix for further discussion.
The acceptance of some form of the Sincerity Rule for actual use would require an effort to
educate those in the legal profession of the benefits derived from the prohibition of post-offer
bargaining and from the possibility that the offeror will have to pay the offeree's fees. If left
unexplained, these counterintuitive requirements are likely to receive criticism (as they have in
comments regarding the simulation).
42. This goal is aided by current legal reform efforts designed to promote similar and pre-
dictable expected jury awards by encouraging early neutral evaluation, court-annexed arbitra-
tion, and summary (advisory) jury trials.
43. As discussed in the next section, a comparison of the stated (rather than the computed)
expectations yields a statistically significant discrepancy between expectations for the two sides,
attributed partly to optimism and imprecise estimation.
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C. Risk Aversion, Sophistication, and Optimism
To the extent that litigants are risk averse, the success of any
given settlement device will be enhanced-at the price, of course, of
risk-averse parties receiving less in a settlement than they might rea-
sonably expect from trial. For a risk-averse party, settlement adds the
appeal of certainty to the potential saving of one's own litigation costs.
Fee-shifting versions of Rule 68 compound the attractiveness of settle-
ment to risk-averse parties by increasing the span of possible out-
comes to include the threat of attorney fee liability. Under the
assumption of rationality, recommending acceptance of a Sincerity
Offer inferior to the offeree's expected jury award is an indication of
risk aversion-the lawyer is forgoing a more favorable expected value
of trial (with fees paid by the adverse party) in exchange for a certain
result. Using this measure, 41% of respondents demonstrated an ele-
ment of risk aversion in their strategy by recommending the accept-
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$1,000; 32% recommended the acceptance of offers inferior by $3,000.
The remaining 59% rejected all offers inferior to their expected judg-
ment, suggesting the absence of risk aversion and its positive influence
on settlement.
Beyond risk aversion, a significant influence on settlement is the
convergence or divergence of adversaries' expectations for trial out-
comes. Given the same statistical information regarding a case (e.g., a
compilation of jury verdict reports from similar cases or a doctor's
report on the probability of various medical procedures being neces-
sary and their costs), the likelihood of two parties making similar esti-
mates of the appropriate settlement value rests not only on tempered
optimism, but on their ability to make accurate inferences from the
data available. Excessive reliance on instinct, for example, provides
no concrete basis for common predictions and no definite check on
damaging optimism. As a measure of the sophistication with which
lawyers use their data, we compared respondents' stated expectation
of the likely jury award to the computed expected value based on
their density function for possible awards. The difference between
computed and stated expectations ($32,717 vs. $28,946 on the plain-
tiff's side and $31,768 vs. $26,652 on the defense side) is statistically
significant at the 95% confidence level, suggesting that imprecise use
of data may contribute to discrepancies between litigants' expected
[Vol. 71:519
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON SETTLEMENT DEVICES
jury awards. 4 The increased teaching of computer skills and statisti-
cal methods in modern law schools and continuing legal education
programs may advance the sophistication of estimation procedures in
litigation.
Undue optimism on the part of either party hinders settlement,
leading litigants to expect overlapping portions of the gains from set-
tlement. As a measure of optimism, we compared the expected ver-
dicts of lawyers acting as counsel for plaintiffs and for defendants. If
plaintiffs' lawyers expect higher verdicts than defendants' lawyers
given identical information, this indicates optimism on the part of one
or both parties. Table 2 contains the means and standard deviations of
expected verdicts based on the lawyers' estimated density function for
possible verdicts, as well as their stated expected verdicts. Although
the means of the computed expectations differ by less than $1,000, the
means of the stated expectations differ by more than $2,000 between
plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers, suggesting that the density func-
tions were estimated more objectively whereas the stated expectation
was based on instincts that are prone to optimism. 45 The difference in
the sample means of the stated expectation for plaintiffs' and defend-
ants' lawyers is almost significant (t = 1.32), and using a Chow test to
control for the effects of optimism on demographic and experience
coefficients, the equality of expectations cannot be accepted at the
80% level of confidence.
V. CONCLUSION
Table 3 presents a summary of testable hypotheses and conjec-
tures along with brief statements of the empirical findings. The results
suggest that a two-sided fee-shifting Rule 68 would have an elevating
effect on defendants' lawyers' recommended maximum bid levels, and
a smaller depressing effect on plaintiffs' lawyers' recommended mini-
mum ask levels. The Rule is less likely to bolster the settlement rate
44. Respondent comments included often-stated resistance to the use of percentages, com-
puters, and statistics. One memorable comment read, "Sorry, but I'm from the Paleolithic pe-
riod and am not (yet) computer literate."
45. For similar findings from a study involving undergraduate and law student subjects as-
signed roles as parties, see George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and
Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993). Given a scenario based on an auto accident
claim, subjects' "predictions of the value of the claim and judgments of what settlement would
be fair" were both found to be "biased in a self-serving manner." Id. at 139. The authors specu-
late, however, that the assessments of lawyer agents as opposed to more directly self-interested
principals might be subject to less self-serving bias. See id. at 156-57. Our finding of significant




markedly, which would require not only moderation in minimum ask
and maximum bid levels, but conciliatory changes in bargaining posi-
tions substantial enough to entice previous hold-outs to settle. The
results of regression analysis indicate that under Rule 68 defendants'
lawyers may recommend the acceptance of 14% higher demands,
while plaintiff's lawyers are estimated to recommend a 7% lower bot-
tom line. These results are supported by simple t-tests performed on
the average maximum bid levels, but contradicted by Chow test esti-
mates that entail less restrictive assumptions. (Such contradictory re-
sults are not uncommon from tests based on differing assumptions
applied to relatively weak empirical relationships.)
Three out of five lawyers exhibited risk-neutral or risk-loving be-
havior, suggesting that to the extent that lawyers influence their cli-
ents' decisions, the lamentable engine of risk aversion that drives Rule
68's theoretical influence on settlement may be low on fuel. Although
a sizable minority of respondents did display some degree of risk aver-
sion, that trait already encourages settlement in the absence of the
incentives provided by offer devices. To make a difference, enhanced
offer rules or the Sincerity Rule must have an impact on those who
are unlikely to settle in the absence of such rules, among whom the
risk averse will be a smaller fraction than in the disputant population.
The Schwarzer proposal currently under consideration by the Civil
Rules Advisory Committee would further moderate settlement en-
couragement by imposing fee liability limits, thus reducing the finan-
cial threat of Rule 68.46 In addition, the strength of the incentives
created by even an enhanced Rule 68 is likely to decline as the
amounts at stake increase, because litigation costs do not usually rise
proportionately with the stakes. 47 Even if a revised version of Rule 68
is adopted, supplemental inducements to settlement may be necessary
to achieve a substantial decrease in the volume of litigation.
The Sincerity Rule, which combines the option to make a legally-
enforced final offer with a mechanism to ensure the fairness of such
offers, is found to foster out-of-court settlement and guide settlement
values towards the expected jury award. The Sincerity Rule per-
formed as expected in the majority of cases, although significant mi-
46. For discussion of the comparability of results under full-fee-liability and the Schwarzer/
Reporter capped versions of Rule 68, based on an earlier study that involved both basic forms,
see supra note 6.
47. See Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice: The Worldwide Movement to
Make Rights Effective-A General Report, in 1 AccEss TO JUsTICE 3, 13 (1978) ("[T]he ratio of
costs to amount in controversy steadily increases as the financial value of the claim goes down.").
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norities of respondents recommended rejection of Sincerity Offers
more favorable than their stated jury award expectations or counseled
acceptance of less favorable ones. These results could flow from the
first-time nature of many respondents' encounters with this rule; re-
peated experimentation, in simulations or in the real world, could
yield more predictable patterns. Still, our results suggest that reform-
ers should not expect anything resembling uniform responses to new
rules, even ones that create strong incentives. The primary flaws in
the Sincerity Rule are its counterintuitive fee-shifting device and its
provision for a credible take-it-or-leave-it offer. If these strange-
seeming but methodologically sound characteristics do not deter its
consideration, the Sincerity Rule could be the basis for new rules that
lead to more and fairer settlements.
Our results show that law students demand settlements 17%
higher than lawyers without tort experience and 8% higher than law-
yers with tort experience given the same case information, suggesting
that caution be taken when projecting results from student samples
into the real world. Finally, perhaps the most intriguing finding in our
research was the divergence between parties' expected trial outcome
based on lawyers' "density functions" of the likelihood of verdicts and
their single stated expectation of the most likely jury award. It is
straightforward to calculate a weighted average expectation from the
density function; the stated expectations differed significantly (run-
ning considerably lower for both sides) from the density function av-
erage expectations, and the stated expectations for the plaintiff's and
defense sides were considerably farther apart than their density func-
tion averages. Respondents may have been giving a mode rather than
mean or median figure as their single stated expectation; but to the
extent that they based bargaining positions on the stated expectation,
they were introducing an element of disagreement not supported by
what may have been their more rational density function estimates.
In short, lawyers may agree more than they think they do-and fail to
reach (or take longer than necessary in reaching) settlements that
their own most rational estimations might suggest to them are in their
clients' interests. This finding underscores the importance both of ed-
ucational emphases on disinterested use of basic mathematical and es-
timating techniques, and of framing litigation rules that encourage





A MORE COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF THE SINCERITY RULE
Consider a case with an expected verdict of approximately
$50,000 and $20,000 attorney fees to each side if the case proceeds to
trial. One possible scenario for this case could be that both sides are
reasonable, rational, and willing to make or accept a settlement ap-
proximately half way between their expected net trial outcomes
(based on similar expectations of the verdict). Under these assump-
tions, a no-rule offer in the vicinity of $50,000 would result in settle-
ment. There would be no need for Rule 68, the Sincerity Rule, or any
other mechanism designed to encourage fair and timely settlement out
of court.
Generally, two alternative scenarios result in the cases that pro-
ceed to trial, as well as those that are settled for inequitable amounts,
or after an inordinate period of time. The first occurs if the two sides
disagree sufficiently over the expected verdict so as to prevent settle-
ment. That is, even if they agree on a 50-50 split of the $40,000 gain
from out-of-court settlement, they disagree over the settlement
amount that would produce that split. If plaintiff thinks the verdict
will be $90,000, she would require that amount from defendant to per-
ceive a 50-50 split of the gains from settlement. Such informational
barriers to settlement are best addressed with summary jury trials,
non-binding arbitration, discovery, etc., rather than settlement de-
vices, none of which directly addresses informational needs.
The second alternative is that the two sides have similar expecta-
tions of the likely trial outcome, but there are attempts to gain from
real or perceived inequities in the bargaining situation. When the as-
sumption of a mutual interest in equity is dropped, there is nothing
apropos about settlements in the $50,000 range. Defendant benefits
from any settlement under $70,000, and plaintiff benefits from any set-
tlement over $30,000. Unequal bargaining positions might result from
one party being unable to afford the uncertainties inherent in jury ver-
dicts, or from a need to uphold a political or corporate reputation by
avoiding trial. Preying on such real or imagined inequities, it is en-
tirely possible that one party would not be willing to accept a no-rule
offer of around $50,000. The refusing party might get its way, immedi-
ately or after a prolonged struggle, with the case coming to a relatively
unfavorable end for the disadvantaged party (e.g., a 20-80 split of the
saving from not going to trial). The refusing party might hold out and
then accept a more equitable offer only after causing considerable
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legal expense for both parties. Or the refusing party might be so stub-
born or misguided about her bargaining superiority as to hold out un-
til trial.
The benefit that a disadvantaged party gains from making a
Sincerity Offer comes from the Rule's potential to ward off any of the
last three undesirable outcomes. In order to avoid trial, an inequita-
ble settlement, or an equitable settlement after prolonged strategic
behavior, a party whose reasonable no-rule offers have been rejected
could make a Sincerity Offer of around $50,000. This offer approxi-
mates a 50-50 split of the gains from settlement and would be ac-
cepted by any rational adversary whose goal is to maximize gains or
minimize losses. Since Sincerity Offers are optional, there would be
no reason to make such an offer to a seemingly irrational or spiteful
adversary.
The purpose of the counter-intuitive fee payment to a party that
refuses a Sincerity Offer is that it elicits offers at or near the expected
jury verdict. (From the standpoint of fairness, we view the expected
jury verdict as the best available target for settlement values.) With
fees paid and no possibility for further bargaining, a party that refuses
a Sincerity Offer will expect to gain the expected jury verdict. Thus,
Sincerity Offers that exceed the expected jury verdict should be ac-
cepted by rational offerees, and those that fall below the expected jury
verdict should rationally be refused. This is true even when one party
has superior bargaining power and would normally be able to refuse
no-rule offers around $50,000 with the expectation that unfair no-rule
counter-offers would be accepted by the disadvantaged party. It is to
remedy these situations that the Sincerity Rule has been considered.
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